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  The empirical literature is unanimous in finding that tenant-based housing 
certificates and vouchers provide housing of any quality at a much lower total cost (that 
is, cost to all levels of government and tenants) than the types of project-based assistance 
studied, namely Public Housing, Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction and 
Substantial Rehab.  However, these studies are so old and inaccessible that they are 
unknown to most people involved in current discussions of housing policy.  This paper 
discusses the theoretical reasons to expect that these types of project-based housing 
programs will have excessive costs, presents a conceptually correct methodology for the 
cost-effectiveness analysis of housing programs, and provides a description and critical 
appraisal of the data and methods used in these earlier studies as well as a summary of 
their results.  It concludes that cost-effectiveness analyses of current forms of project- 
based housing assistance should be the highest priority for research on housing policy.  2 
I. Introduction 
 
Between 1937 and 1974, the U.S. government delivered rental housing subsidies 
to low-income households almost exclusively via the construction and operation of 
housing projects for these households.  Local public housing authorities operated all of 
the projects built during the first seventeen years.
1 
In 1954, the federal government began to contract with private parties to build and 
operate projects for low-income households, while still continuing to build public 
housing projects.  These parties agreed to provide housing meeting certain standards to 
households with particular characteristics for a specified number of years.  The 
overwhelming majority of the projects were newly built.  Almost all of the rest were 
substantially rehabilitated as a condition for participation in the program. 
The earlier programs such as HUD’s Section 221(d)(3) Market Interest Rate 
(MIR) Program and Section 202 Program limited the private parties who operate the 
projects to nonprofits and cooperatives.
2  These programs were succeeded by programs 
such as Section 236 that allowed the participation of for-profit firms, while attempting to 
limit their profits by restricting their net revenues during the period of the use agreement.  
For-profit firms have accounted for the majority of the units in the most recent programs 
such as Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation and the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit. 
Until 1965, all housing assistance to the poor was project-based and the 
overwhelming majority of units were newly constructed under a government program.  In 
1965 Congress created Section 23, a program under which public housing authorities 
could lease apartments in existing private unsubsidized housing for the use of households 
eligible for public housing.  One variant of this program allowed tenants to locate their 
own apartments meeting the program’s minimum standards.  This was the first program 
of tenant-based assistance in the United States. 
                                                 
1 The dates mentioned in this section are the dates of the legislation that led to programs.  Programs do not 
become operational until regulations are written. 
2 Although the original Section 221(d)(3) Program is called the Market Interest Rate Program, both 
programs provide financing at below-market interest rates.  The later Section 221(d)(3) Below-Market 
Interest Rate (BMIR) Program provided a more substantial interest subsidy than the Section 221(d)(3) MIR 
Program.  3 
In 1974, the Section 8 Existing Housing Program replaced Section 23.  Since 
then, tenant-based Section 8 has become the country’s largest program of housing 
assistance.  The original program was called the Certificate Program.  Another program 
of tenant-based housing assistance, called the Section 8 Voucher Program, that had 
somewhat different constraints than the Certificate Program was introduced as a 
demonstration program in 1983 and made permanent in 1989.  This program operated 
simultaneously with the Certificate Program until 1998 when the two programs were 
consolidated into another tenant-based program, called the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program, which combined features of the two earlier programs. 
Research on the cost-effectiveness of various types of project-based assistance 
was influential in the enactment of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program and its rapid 
growth.  This research indicated that the development and operating cost of units built 
under the construction programs studied greatly exceeded the market rents of these units.  
This research was also influential in bringing about the termination of the Section 8 New 
Construction / Substantial Rehabilitation Program in 1983.  Since then, few new units 
have been authorized under HUD’s construction programs.
3 
Despite the rapid growth of the tenant-based Section 8 Certificate and Voucher 
Programs, the majority of additional recipients of rental housing assistance since 1983 
have received project-based assistance.  In part this is due to the completion of Section 8 
New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation projects that were in the pipeline at the time 
that the program was terminated.  More important has been the rapid growth of the IRS’s 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) that was enacted hastily as a part of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.  More than a million units have been authorized, and about 700,000 
units have been built, under this program.  It will soon become the second largest housing 
program for low-income households.  Furthermore, with substantial money from HUD, 
local housing authorities are demolishing their worst projects and building additional 
projects, albeit at lower densities.  HUD also provides substantial block grants to state 
and local housing agencies under the HOME Investment Partnerships Program enacted in 
1990.  These funds are used primarily for project-based assistance.  Finally, HUD devotes 
                                                 
3 Many additional units were built after 1983 due to the long lags between the time that money is 
appropriated under these programs and the time that projects are completed.  4 
a substantial fraction of its budget to operating and modernization subsidies for public 
housing and privately owned projects, beyond the subsidies promised at the time that 
these projects were built.  In short, there has been a tremendous resurgence in project-
based assistance via the tax system, federal block grants to state and local governments, 
and the substantial additional subsidies to public housing and privately owned projects. 
Since these new and revised programs have the features that were believed to be 
the source of the substantial cost-ineffectiveness of the programs studied, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that recent housing policies have been designed by policymakers 
who are unaware of the previous research.  The reasons for this ignorance are not hard to 
imagine.  First, the LIHTC was designed rapidly with little input from housing policy 
specialists who would have been aware of the aforementioned studies.  Second, the 
existing studies are old.  The most recent study was completed in 1982.  Third, they are 
either highly technical or poorly documented.  Three of the five are lengthy technical 
reports on research done under HUD contracts.  It is safe to say that few people have 
waded through these studies, and many who did read them have not been involved in 
discussions of housing policy in recent times.  The methods used in the oldest of the 
studies were not published.
4 
Based on the most reliable existing estimates of cost-effectiveness, we could serve 
all current recipients of housing subsidies as well as they are currently served (that is, 
equally good housing with the same tenant rental payment) and serve several million 
additional households below the poverty line by devoting all of the money currently 
devoted to discretionary project-based assistance to tenant-based assistance.  Since the 
current programs of project-based assistance are not identical to the programs that have 
been studied, it would obviously be desirable to launch cost-effectiveness studies of all of 
the major discretionary expenditures on project-based assistance such as incremental 
commitments under the LIHTC and HOPE VI and public housing operating and 
modernization subsidies.  However, since these would be multi-year projects involving 
substantial original data collection and are more likely to be launched by policymakers 
who are aware of the findings of the earlier studies, an important first step is to provide a 
                                                 
4 I have complete documentation of the data and methods used to estimate the cost-effectiveness of public 
housing in Housing in the Seventies.  5 
clear description and critical appraisal of the data and methods used in these earlier 
studies as well as a summary of the results.  These are the purposes of this paper. 
Section 2 discusses the reasons to expect that project-based housing assistance 
will be cost-ineffective compared with tenant-based vouchers.  Section 3 describes the 
steps in an ideal cost-effectiveness analysis.  Section 4 compares the methodology used in 
previous studies with the ideal and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the data and 
methods used to estimate the inputs required to calculate the cost-effectiveness of the 
program under consideration.  Section 5 summarizes the results. 
 
II.  Theoretical Expectations about Cost-Effectiveness 
 
All cost-effectiveness analyses of housing programs involve a comparison of the 
total cost of providing the housing with its market rent.  For tenant-based vouchers and 
certificates, the approach is straightforward because all of the costs associated with 
providing the housing during a period occur in that period and they are all in the records 
of the administering agency.  Dealing with project-based assistance is more difficult 
because the time path of costs bears no particular relationship to the time path of the 
market rents of the units and all project-based assistance involves indirect costs that are 
not in the records of the administering agency.  The most widely accepted measure of 
cost-effectiveness for project-based housing assistance is the ratio of (1) the present value 
of the rents paid by tenants and all direct and indirect costs incurred by federal, state, and 
local governments to (2) the present value of the market rents of the units over the period 
that the units are used to house subsidized families.  If a government owns the project at 
the time that it stops being used to house subsidized families, the present value of the 
project’s market value at that time should be subtracted from the present value of the 
costs. 
This measure of cost-effectiveness does not capture all of the potential benefits or 
costs of a housing program.  For example, it is possible that some housing projects make 
the neighborhoods in which they are located more attractive places to live.  Other projects 
may have the opposite effect.  The standard measure of cost-effectiveness captures 
neither positive nor negative effects of this sort.  6 
Broadly speaking, there are three potential sources of cost-ineffectiveness of 
housing programs – distortions in input choices for producing housing services, 
insufficient incentives for efficiency on the part of civil servants, and excessive profits to 
developers of private projects.  This section discusses each source. 
Almost all of the subsidies for housing projects are subsidies for the initial 
development of the project or subsidies that are independent of input usage.  For 
example, some programs provide direct loans for development at below-market interest 
rates, others pay a fixed proportion of the mortgage payment on private loans, still others 
provide tax credits that are proportional to development cost, and some pay directly the 
entire development cost.  Among subsidies that do not depend on input usage are rental 
assistance payments under the Section 8 NC/SR Program and Public Housing operating 
subsidies since 1975.  (Although they are called operating subsidies, the latter do not 
depend on the housing authority’s actions.) 
This has led some to conclude that housing services in these projects will be 
produced with too much initial capital and too little of other inputs from the viewpoint of 
efficient production.  However, since all of these programs contain limits on development 
costs, the net effect on input usage is ambiguous on theoretical grounds.  Nevertheless, 
the combination of capital subsidies and development cost limits surely results in 
productive inefficiency to some extent. 
The preceding argument applies most directly to for-profit firms who own and 
operate housing for low-income households.  However, to the extent that the decision 
makers in local housing authorities and nonprofit organizations are interested in the well 
being of the occupants of their projects rather than taxpayers elsewhere, they apply with 
some force to these other providers. 
Another incentive for inefficient production of housing services in privately- 
owned projects is that the supplier’s revenue is independent of the condition of the 
apartment, provided that it meets the program’s minimum occupancy standards.  Given 
the below-market rents that subsidized households are charged, there is a tremendous 
excess demand for these units for many years after they are built.  Therefore, owners will 
have no trouble renting these units even if they are allowed to deteriorate substantially.   7 
Just as in the case of simple rent control, this should lead to too little maintenance from 
the viewpoint of efficient production of housing services. 
An additional source of inefficiency is involved in the case of public housing. 
Under the public housing program, government employees make all of the decisions that 
are made by managers of profit maximizing firms in the private market.  These include 
the exact specifications of the project to be built and exactly what maintenance and 
renovations to undertake.  These decisionmakers also must monitor the performance of 
the employees of the housing authorities.  The government managers involved do not 
have the same financial incentives to operate efficiently as owners of private rental 
housing.  If they make good decisions, they are not rewarded.  If they make bad 
decisions, they suffer no consequences over a wide range of bad decisions.  Indeed, they 
cannot easily learn whether they have made good or bad decisions.  Due to the subsidy, 
they will not lose their tenants even if they make bad decisions. 
The other construction and rehabilitation programs such as Section 8 NC/SR and 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit provide subsidies to selected private suppliers, 
albeit with restrictions concerning who may live in the units, how much rent may be 
charged, etc.  The subsidies and restrictions are designed (or redesigned based on initial 
experience) to insure that the money budgeted is spent. In all cases, the result has been 
that many more suppliers want to participate than can be accommodated with available 
funds.  For example, developers have requested three times as much money as state 
housing agencies have to allocate under the LIHTC.  The reason that there is an excess 
demand for program funds by suppliers of housing is that those who are allowed to 
participate make excessive profits, provided that they do not have to pay anything for the 
privilege.  Why else would these developers be willing to pay so much money to 
influential people for help in getting their projects approved? 
 
III.  An Ideal Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
 
In calculating the cost-effectiveness of a housing program involving new 
construction or substantial rehabilitation, it is essential to take a life cycle approach.  
Consider, for example, two construction programs that produce identical housing in the  8 
same locations.  Assume that the units are equally well maintained over time.  So the 
units under these programs are identical at every point in time and hence the programs 
are equally effective.  Assume that the initial development cost and later operating cost 
under the two programs are the same, but that the initial development cost is financed by 
a capital grant under one program and by annual contributions to pay principal and 
interest on a market-rate loan under the other program.  These programs are equally cost-
effective.  However, if we base our estimates of cost-effectiveness on the market rents of 
the units and the costs paid in any year after the payment of the capital grant and before 
the repayment of the loan, we will incorrectly conclude that the program that received the 
capital grant is much more cost-effective.  Although taking a life cycle perspective to the 
cost-effectiveness of housing programs is more difficult, it is both feasible and essential 
for making meaningful comparisons of different types of housing programs. 
The conceptually correct method for conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis of a 
housing program is straightforward.  In each year of its existence, a certain total cost C(t) 
is incurred and the units occupied under the program had a certain total market rent R(t).  
If none of the units built or rehabilitated under a program are used any longer to house 
low-income households under that program and if the government did not own the 
projects under the program, then the cost-effectiveness of the program is simply the ratio 
of the present value of the costs C(t) to the present value of the market rents R(t) at some 
appropriate interest rate.  (The appropriate interest rate is an important conceptual issue 
that will be discussed later so as not to detract from the flow of the analysis.)  The present 
value of the cost is simply 
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  The overwhelming majority of the units built or rehabilitated under all of the 
programs under consideration are still in existence.  Most of these units continue to be 
used to house low-income households in the program under which they were built or 
rehabilitated.  Many others continue to be used to house low-income households under 
more recent programs that require assisted households to live in the units in order to 
receive a subsidy.  That is, the projects have been shifted from one government housing 
program to another.  This includes many units occupied by recipients of Section 8 
certificates that are tied to particular units.  Finally, some projects no longer have ties to a 
particular housing program except when individual units happen to be occupied by 
recipients of vouchers and certificates who have freely chosen these units. 
In some of the preceding cases, a governmental entity such as a local housing 
authority owns the project.  In other cases, private parties own the project.  In many of 
these cases, the government continues to have contractual financial obligations to the 
private parties, and the private parties have obligations to the government to provide 
housing meeting certain standards to specified types of households for some additional 
period of time.  In all of these cases, the simple formulas above must be modified to 
determine the true cost-effectiveness of the program. 
To see why, consider the case of a public housing project that is still in use.  
Suppose that the federal government has already paid all of the development cost of the 
project.  If we want to determine the cost-effectiveness of the project in providing 
housing to low-income households over its entire existence, the present value of the costs 
incurred to date overstate the true costs because these costs produced more than the flow 
of services up to the present time.  They also produced land and structure with some 
current market value.  Therefore, we should subtract from the present value of the costs 
the present value of the current market value of the project. The market value is the 
relevant price to subtract even if the property is sold at a below-market price to some user 
regarded as worthy of a subsidy.  The excess of the market price over the sales price is a 
subsidy to the new use of the property.  It is not a cost of providing housing under the 
subsidized housing program.  If, however, it were sold at a below-market price to line the 
pockets of someone, then the sales price rather than the market value should be used in  10 
the cost-effectiveness analysis.  This is merely one of the inefficiencies of the housing 
program.  Ignoring this possibility, the present value of the cost is  
 
 
where M(T) is the market value of the project on the last day at which data for the cost-
effectiveness analysis is available. 
This approach correctly accounts for recent modernization expenditures funded 
by a capital grant.  A modernization project improves the housing not only in the year in 
which the expenditure occurs but also in later years.  Indeed, the bulk of the benefit 
occurs in later years.  To the extent that modernization projects provide better housing 
beyond the current period, the market value of the project will be higher.  The preceding 
formula correctly accounts for these future benefits.  For example, a modernization 
project costing $1,000,000 that was just completed and paid for at the end of the last 
period and that increased the market value of the project by only $500,000 would 
increase the present value of the costs by the present value of $500,000 without affecting 
the present value of the market rents through the end of the last period.  In the preceding 
formulas, the modernization project would increase C(T) by $1,000,000, increase M(T) 
by $500,000, and have no effect on R(T).  Hence, it would reduce the cost-effectiveness 
of the project. 
Now consider the case of a project owned and operated by private parties under 
contract with the government to provide housing to low-income households.  For 
simplicity, assume that this project has been under the same program since its 
construction or rehabilitation.  The government may have provided some upfront subsidy, 
and it might have agreed to pay certain rents for the units over the term of the contract.  
Suppose that we have not reached the end of the contract so that the government has 
future contractual obligations.  The owners have agreed to serve certain types of 
households and to provide housing meeting certain standards over the entire term of the 
contract.  Even if the standards were vigorously enforced, this does not mean that the 
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The standards do not apply to all aspects of the housing and the units may have exceeded 
standards when they were built.  The failure to vigorously enforce standards creates 
additional opportunities for variation in the market rents of the units over time.  In this 
case, we would want to add the present value of predictions of the market rents of the 
units over the remaining years of the project to the present value of market rents up to the 
current time and the present value of the rents that the government has agreed to pay over 
this period to the present value of the costs incurred up to the present time. 
Since the government does not own the project at the end of the contract, its 
market value should not be subtracted from the present value of the costs.  It may be the 
case that this program has provided a windfall gain to the owners of the project by giving 
them an unusually valuable property at the end of the contract given the magnitude of 
their investment.  If so, this is one of the inefficiencies of this type of housing subsidy. 
If a project that is owned and operated by private parties under contract with the 
government to provide housing to low-income households has shifted from one program 
to another, for example, Section 236 to Section 8, then the project has a cost-
effectiveness under the first program that may differ from its cost-effectiveness under the 
second program.  Ideally, we would calculate its cost-effectiveness under the first 
program by subtracting the present value of the market value of the project at the time of 
its conversion from the present value of the costs incurred under the initial program and 
then include this market value as its initial cost under the second program.  A more 
practical alternative would be to treat projects that are operated under several programs as 
if they are operated under a completely separate program, for example, Section 236/8. 
Unless the ratio of total cost to market rent is about the same in each year of a 
program’s existence as in the case of vouchers and certificates, the cost-effectiveness of a 
program depends importantly on the discount rate used to calculate the present values.  
The issue of the appropriate discount rate to use for a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
housing programs has not been seriously considered in the literature on this topic. 
Although it should be addressed in a serious discussion of the conceptually 
correct approach to the cost-effectiveness of any program involving streams of costs and 
output, it will not be addressed here except to point out a problem with an obvious 
approach, namely to use the discount rate r(0) specified by OMB for evaluating streams  12 
of benefits and costs.
5  Suppose, for simplicity, that the entire amount necessary to pay 
for a project is borrowed at a market rate of interest r(1).  If r(0) is less than r(1), the 
present value of the mortgage payments at the OMB discount rate will be greater than the 
initial cost of the project.  In this case, to say that r(0) is the appropriate discount rate for 
this stream of costs is to say that it is better for the government to pay for the project with 
a capital grant than by making mortgage payments on a market-rate loan.  Since the 
federal government can borrow at a lower interest rate than any private business, this line 
of reasoning seems to lead to the implausible conclusion that we could reduce the cost of 
production of all goods by financing all private businesses through government loans 
financed by government borrowing. 
 
IV.  Description and Evaluation of Past Studies 
 
A.  Practical Problems Encountered in Studies of Project-Based Assistance. 
 
Before proceeding to describe and evaluate previous studies of the cost-
effectiveness of project-based housing assistance, it is useful to mention the practical 
problems that have made it difficult to implement the approach described in the 
preceding section. 
First, although data on some of the immutable characteristics of the projects such 
as the number of apartments, the type of building materials, some amenities, and address 
are available for most programs in their administrative records, data on the condition of 
the unit in each year from initial occupancy to the present is not readily available.  Since 
these units are supposed to be checked for compliance with the program’s housing 
quality standards each year, substantial information should be available in the local 
offices that conduct these inspections, but it is almost surely not retained for very long.
6  
Therefore, predicting the market rents of units in the project over the life of the project 
poses a substantial challenge. 
                                                 
5 It should and will be addressed in a later draft of this paper. 
6 To the best of my knowledge, no one has attempted to obtain information from this source.  13 
Second, subsidized projects typically receive subsidies from multiple sources, and 
the magnitude of these subsidies does not appear in the records of one agency.  For 
example, state housing agencies select and administer many Section 8 NC/SR projects.  
These projects were financed with bonds whose interest is tax deductible, receive 
periodic housing assistance payments from HUD, and sometimes receive local property 
tax exemptions or abatements.  The typical LIHTC project receives subsidies from many 
sources and the number and types of subsidies received vary greatly across projects.  
These projects often receive loans at below-market interest rates from many sources 
(Cummings and DiPasquale, 1999; Stegman, 1991) and about 39 percent of the units 
receive periodic project-based Section 8 housing assistance payments (GAO, 1997, p.40).  
As a general matter, the magnitudes of indirect subsidies such as tax exempt financing 
and local property taxes do not appear in the records of any agency, and the magnitude of 
each direct subsidy appears in the records of the agency that provides it. 
When different projects under a broad program receive different combinations of 
subsidies, we are faced with the issue of whether and how to distinguish between these 
different program variants.  At one extreme, all of the sources of funding for housing 
subsidies could be enumerated, and the units receiving each combination of these 
subsidies could be treated as being part of a separate housing program.  In this case, all 
units built under the LIHTC but receiving no other housing subsidies directly or 
indirectly would comprise one program.  All units built under the LIHTC, occupied by 
households with Section 8 certificates, but receiving no other types of housing subsidy 
would comprise another housing program.  At the other extreme, we could analyze broad 
programs of project-based assistance such as public housing and Section 8 New 
Construction.  This would lead to estimates of cost-effectiveness that are averages of all 
of the variants within each broad program. 
 
B.  Housing in the Seventies (1974) 
 
The National Housing Policy Review Task Force conducted the first major cost-
effectiveness analyses of housing programs in 1973.  The results are reported in U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing in the Seventies, 1974,  14 
Chapter 4.  This study was done rapidly during President Nixon’s moratorium on 
additional commitments under low-income housing programs. 
Although a technical appendix describing how the results were obtained was not 
published, I can describe the data and methodology underlying the study of public 
housing because I did this study.  Since this study used the conceptually correct 
methodology and it has not been fully implemented in later studies, it is worth reviewing. 
The data underlying the estimates of the cost-effectiveness of public housing are 
for 11 projects located in 6 large cities (Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, St. Louis, San 
Francisco, Washington).  Neither the cities nor the projects were chosen at random.  
These projects were completed between 1953 and 1970.  Ten of the projects are 
conventional public housing and one is turnkey public housing.  (Under turnkey public 
housing, developers choose the design and location of proposed projects.) 
The data on development and operating cost and project physical characteristics 
come from HUD administrative records.  The Development Cost Summary contains the 
cost of developing every public housing project for each year during the construction 
period.  (For the projects in this study, the construction period was never less than one or 
more than four years.)  The DCS also contains information on the number of units of 
each size in each project.  About 3% of public housing units under management in 1971 
were built on urban renewal sites.  Since these sites are transferred to public housing 
authorities at no cost or possibly sold at a below-market price and we could not easily 
obtain the market value of this land, we did not select any projects built on urban renewal 
sites.  Some public housing is built on land donated by other federal agencies (e.g., land 
on military bases that were closed after the Second World War) and local governments.  
However, we did not figure out how to identify these projects, and we did not know the 
fraction of public housing projects in this category.  If one of our projects received this 
indirect subsidy, we understated its development cost. 
Data on the cost of operating public housing are not usually available at the 
project level.  However, data on each year’s operating cost and number of units are 
available at the level of the housing authority from the Statement of Operating Receipts 
and Expenditures.  It was assumed that each of the 11 projects in the sample had the 
average operating cost for its PHA each year.  This probably overstates the true operating  15 
cost since the public housing program began in 1937 and none of the units in the sample 
were completed before 1953.  That is, these projects were among the newest at the time 
of the study.  Obviously, it would have been possible to improve upon the predictions of 
the operating costs of these projects with the data that was available. 
To get a correct measure of the true operating costs of providing housing in public 
housing projects, two adjustments to the data on operating expense are required.  First, a 
part of the administrative cost is the cost of administering a transfer program such as 
checking on eligibility.  These are costs that are not incurred by providers of 
unsubsidized housing.  Based on rather crude previous research, one half of the local 
housing authority (LHA) administrative cost was attributed to administering a transfer 
program as opposed to managing housing.  This amount was subtracted from the LHA’s 
administrative cost.  Federal administrative cost was ignored.  Second, local housing 
authorities do not pay full property taxes.  Instead they make a small payment in lieu of 
property taxes (PILOT).  To obtain the full cost of operating public housing, it is 
necessary to add to the reported costs the difference between full property taxes and 
PILOT.  To obtain the full property taxes on public housing units in each city, we 
multiplied an estimate of the market rent of all of the units in a project by the ratio of full 
property tax to rent for unsubsidized units in each city reported in a well-regarded study 
of the property tax (Netzer, 1966). 
The present value of the stream of development and operating costs through 1971, 
the last year of the data used in the study, overstates the cost that has been incurred up to 
that point to provide housing to public housing tenants because the land and structure 
have a market value at that time.  The present value of the market value of the project 
must be subtracted from the present value of the stream of costs to obtain the present 
value of the costs incurred to provide housing up to the last year of the data. 
The market value of each of the projects at the end of 1971 was estimated by 
multiplying an estimate of the market rent of the public housing units in the last year of 
the data by an estimate of the ratio of market value to the previous year’s market rent for 
unsubsidized rental housing sold in recent years (that is, the gross rent multiplier).  The 
estimate of the ratio of market value to the previous year’s market rent for unsubsidized 
rental housing sold in recent years was obtained from a person working on the Task  16 
Force who had many years of experience in the D.C. real estate market.  The ratio of 
value to annual rent used to predict the market value of each project in 1971 was seven.  
That is, we multiplied an estimate of the annual market rent of all of the units in the 
project by seven to get a prediction of what the project could be sold for if it were sold to 
the highest bidder.  Obviously more care in making the prediction of market value of 
each project would have been desirable.  However, the time available to complete the 
project precluded a more careful analysis. 
The final element needed to complete the cost-effectiveness analysis is a 
prediction of the market rents of all of the units in a project from the first year that they 
were occupied through the last year of the data.  The present value of these market rents 
tells us what we got for our money in terms of housing provided to recipients.  The last 
year’s market rents are also used to predict the market sales price of the project.  These 
predictions were based in part on Robert Gillingham’s estimated relationships between 
market rent and housing characteristics in the cities involved in 1960.  (Gillingham was 
in the Research Division of the BLS’s Office of Prices and Living Conditions at the time, 
and his methods, data, and results were well documented in a research discussion paper.)  
The Project Physical Characteristics form contains information on many characteristics of 
the public housing projects that appear in Gillingham’s regression.  I made educated 
guesses about a few variables.  For example, since the oldest project was built in 1953 
and hence was less than 20 years old in the last year of the study, I assumed that none of 
the units in these projects were deteriorating or dilapidated in any year between 1953 and 
1971 as the Census Bureau used these terms in 1960.  Combining Gillingham’s estimated 
equations, data from PPC, and some innocuous assumptions enabled me to predict the 
market rent of each of the units in the projects in 1960.  To predict market rents in other 
years, I used Gillingham’s equation to adjust rent for changes in the age, and hence 
condition, of the units and the BLS housing price index in each city to adjust for changes 
in housing prices. 
The stream of costs (minus the market sales value of the project in the last year) 
and market rents were both discounted at 7.5% back to the first year that expenses were 
incurred to build the project.  This was approximately the interest rate on first mortgages  17 
in 1971.  Limited time permitted little consideration of the appropriateness of this interest 
rate. 
For 9 of the 11 projects, the present value of the costs exceeded the present value 
of the market rents.  The ratio of the present value of the costs to the present value of the 
market rents varied from .87 to 2.05.  When all figures were expressed in 1971 
Washington, D.C. prices and aggregated over all projects, the conclusion was that it costs 
$1.17 to provide a dollar’s worth of housing under the public housing program, excluding 
the costs of administering a transfer program. 
Another important result of this study is that only 42 percent of the cost of the 
public housing program to the federal and local governments appeared explicitly in the 
HUD budget.  Thirty six percent of the cost to governments was attributable to the tax 
exempt status of the interest earned on local authority bonds, and another 22 percent to 
the difference between full property taxes and the smaller payments made by local 
housing authorities to local governments.  (The former indirect subsidy has not existed 
since 1987 when development grants replaced annual contribution contracts.  However, 
almost all public housing was built before that date.)  Since many project-based programs 
involve subsidies that do not appear on the books of the agency administering the 
program, the preceding result makes clear the importance of considering subsidies from 
all sources in assessing the cost-effectiveness of alternative programs. 
These results are obviously based on a small sample, and many of the predictions 
of individual elements required in the analysis are highly improvable.  However, from the 
viewpoint of illustrating the appropriate methodology, this is still the best study in 
existence.  Later studies were typically based on more and better data, but did not 
implement the full life cycle approach. 
 
C.  The Benefits and Costs of Public Housing in New York City (1983) 
 
Olsen and Barton’s study of public housing in New York City illustrates a more 
typical approach to estimating the cost-effectiveness of a housing program.
7  It attempted 
to estimate the market rents of public housing units in 1965 and 1968 and what the 
                                                 
7 In 1968, New York City accounted for 21 percent of all public housing in the United States.  18 
expenses of the New York City Housing Authority would have been in 1965 and 1968 if 
the interest on their bonds had been subject to federal income taxation and they were 
required to pay full property taxes.  It ignores market rents and costs in other years. 
Using data on the initial development cost and completion date of each public 
housing project in New York City, we calculated how much the authority would have 
been paying on its loans in 1965 and 1969 had it borrowed at an appropriate market rate 
of interest and made equal payments on these loans over 40 years.  (Almost all permanent 
financing was of this duration.) 
The problem with this approach is that it involves an arbitrary allocation of the 
original development cost to particular years.  For example, none of the original 
development cost would be attributed to any year beyond the fortieth.  Virtually all public 
housing built in the 1940s has continued to provide housing for the past twenty years, and 
its ability to do it depends on the land and large parts of the structure built more than 60 
years ago. 
To this amount attributed to development cost, we added the Authority’s 
operating cost, excluding all administrative costs, and an estimate of difference between 
full property taxes (based on the ratio of property taxes to rents of unsubsidized, 
uncontrolled rental housing in NYC and estimates of the market rents of public housing 
units) and the Authority’s PILOT.  The exclusion of all administrative expenses 
understates somewhat the cost of providing housing since some of the administrative cost 
is attributable to the ordinary functions of operating rental housing in the unsubsidized 
sector.  The preceding approach does account for the two major hidden subsidies 
involved in public housing. 
An equation explaining the market rents of unsubsidized, uncontrolled rental 
housing in terms of their characteristics was estimated using data from the 1965 and 1968 
NYC Housing and Vacancy Survey.  This survey collected a limited set of housing 
characteristics, namely number of bedrooms and other rooms, age of the building, 
condition of the apartment (sound, deteriorating, or dilapidated), borough, story of the 
unit, presence of an elevator, and type of heating.  This creates the possibility of 
substantial differences in the desirability of unsubsidized, uncontrolled rental units and  19 
public housing units with the same observed characteristics and hence badly biased 
predictions of the market rents of public housing units based on this estimated equation. 
These estimated equations were used to predict the market rents of each of the 
1366 public housing units in the 1965 Survey and the 1515 units in the 1968 Survey.  
Since the Survey was a random sample of all addresses in the city, the mean of these 
predicted rents in each year was the prediction of the mean market rent of all public 
housing units in that year. 
Based on these estimates of market rents and costs, we concluded that it cost 
$1.10 to produce a dollar’s worth of housing under the public housing program in 1965 
and $1.15 in 1968.  Recall that administrative costs are not included.  These are the 
smallest estimates of the inefficiency of public housing in existence. 
 
D.  Housing Allowances and Other Rental Assistance Programs (1980) 
 
Mayo, Mansfield, Warner, Zwetchkenbaum (1980) study the cost-effectiveness of 
public housing (conventional and turnkey), Section 236 (new construction and substantial 
rehab), Section 23 Existing (the precursor to Section 8 Existing), and housing allowances 
(minimum condition type used in Experimental Housing Allowance Program and in the 
Section 8 Existing Voucher Program in effect between 1983 and 1999) in Pittsburgh and 
Phoenix.
8  They use data on the development cost of public housing units built between 
1952 and 1974, Section 236 projects built between 1969 and 1975, and operating costs 
and characteristics of all apartments in 1975.  The sizes of their random samples are: 
 
Program/Urban Area  Pittsburgh  Phoenix 
Public Housing  241  225 
Section 236  281  87 
Section 23  93  138 
Housing Allowances  83  65 
 
                                                 
8 Mayo (1986) summarizes the results of this study, the study by Wallace and others (1981), and similar 
studies of German project-based and tenant-based programs.  However, he does not provide a detailed 
description or critical evaluation of these studies.  20 
Although their study includes a brief life cycle analysis based on many strong 
assumptions, the bulk of the report compares the annualized development cost and total 
operating cost in 1975 with the predicted market rent of the unit.  For the construction 
programs, the annuitized present value of the costs associated with building each project 
is added to the operating cost, full property tax, and administrative cost of the project in 
1975.  To account for the change in cost over time and differences in the sizes of units, 
this measure of total annual cost per unit is regressed on variables accounting for the year 
built and the average size of the apartments in the project.  This regression is used to 
predict the annuitized development cost and first-year cost of each apartment in the 
sample had it been built in 1975.  For programs using the existing stock, the total cost is 
calculated as the sum of the rental payment to the owner, operating costs (Section 23), tax 
losses from accelerated depreciation, and administrative costs in 1975.  Data on 
unsubsidized units in each area is used to estimate a statistical relationship explaining 
market rent in terms of housing and neighborhood characteristics in 1973.  
Characteristics of subsidized units are substituted into the estimated relationship to 
predict their market rents in that year, and then housing price indices were used to 
express predicted market rents in 1975 prices. 
This study has many strengths.  It accounts for all major direct and indirect 
subsidies.  It is based on accurate data on capital costs at the times that projects were built 
and operating costs, local property taxes, and administrative cost in 1975.  The costs of 
Public Housing and Section 236 are adjusted for price changes to reflect costs of building 
new units in 1975 and operating them in their first year.  The study makes accurate 
predictions of market rents of subsidized units in 1975 based on numerous characteristics 
of the dwelling units and their neighborhoods and a hedonic regression estimated with a 
large random sample of about 1600 unsubsidized units in each area. 
The weakness of the basic approach is that it ignores market rents and all 
operating costs beyond the first year.  In order to see the likely direction and magnitude 
of the bias from using these shortcuts, it is helpful to write the conceptually correct 
measure in annualized terms.  The conceptually correct measure is 
 
(DC + PVOC)/PVMR,  21 
 
where DC is a project’s development cost, PVOC is the present value of operating costs, 
and PVMR is the present value of the market rents of the project’s units.  For simplicity, 
assume that these present values are for the entire period that the project is used to house 
subsidized households and that it is not owned by the government at the end of this 
period.  This measure is identical to 
 
[a(r,T)·DC + a(r,T)·PVOC]/a(r,T)·PVMR, 
 
where a(r,T) is the annual repayment over T years on a loan of $1 at an annual interest 
rate of r. 
The shortcut measures of cost-effectiveness such as Mayo, Mansfield, Warner, 
Zwetchkenbaum’s measure typically use the annualized development cost a(r,T)·DC that 
appears in this formula.  If the authors of these studies had used the annualized present 
values of operating costs and market rents in the preceding formula, they would have 
obtained the same results as the life cycle approach. Instead they have used the operating 
expense and market rent for a single year. 
If operating cost and market rent increased at the same constant rate in nominal 
terms, the annualized PVOR would exceed the operating cost in the first year by the same 
percentage as the annualized PVMR exceeds the market rent in the first year.  As a result, 
the shortcut measure based on the annualized operating cost and market rent in the first 
year of the project would overstate the cost-ineffectiveness of the project.  That is, 
 
[a(r,T)·DC +·OC(1)]/MR(1) > [a(r,T)·DC + a(r,T)·PVOC]/a(r,T)·PVMR, 
 
where OC(1) is operating cost and MR(1) is the market rent in the first year of operation.  
The expression on the left side of the inequality is the primary measure used by Mayo, 
Mansfield, Warner, Zwetchkenbaum.  The expression on the right side of the inequality is 
the conceptually correct measure. 
  Unfortunately, the assumption underlying this inequality is implausible on a priori 
grounds and is inconsistent with the available evidence.  A priori, it is reasonable to  22 
believe that operating costs increase over time because both the quantities and prices of 
operating inputs increase, market rents increase due to inflation in housing prices and 
decrease due to real depreciation, and housing prices typically increase at about the same 
rate as the prices of operating inputs.  As a result, operating costs per unit increase at a 
faster rate than market rents. 
The data on public housing that underlies the results in U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (1974) supports this view.  In each of the nine projects 
for which data were available, the ratio of operating cost to market rent increased 
between 1958, the first year for which data were available, and 1971, the last year of the 
data.  The median rose from .50 to .64.  (Two of the eleven projects studied had been in 
operation for less than two years and hence did not provide useful information about this 
matter.) 
If the rate of increase in operating cost exceeds the rate of increase in market rent 
by a sufficient margin, the inequality above is reversed.  That is, the measure based on 
operating cost and market rent in the first year understates the cost-ineffectiveness of the 
program. 
Applying the measure used by Mayo, Mansfield, Warner, Zwetchkenbaum to the 
data from the 1974 HUD study provides some insight into the direction and magnitude of 
the bias resulting from using first-year operating cost and market rent instead of the 
annualized present values of operating costs and market rents in calculating cost-
effectiveness.  For eight of the eleven projects, the first-year approach understates the 
cost-ineffectiveness of public housing.  The largest understatement is 40 percent.  The 
largest overstatement is 16 percent.  These results confirm that the bias can be in either 
direction and suggest that this shortcut typically understates the cost-ineffectiveness of 
public housing. 
Mayo, Mansfield, Warner, Zwetchkenbaum (pp. 157-169) recognize the 
conceptual superiority of the life cycle approach to cost-effectiveness analysis, and they 
estimate cost-effectiveness measures based on this approach based on a range of 
alternative assumptions about rates of increase in operating costs and market rents.  The 
qualitative results are unaffected by these sensitivity analyses.  However, the sensitivity  23 
analyses are not based on data on actual time trends in market rent or operating cost 
under any housing program. 
The table below reports the results of their basic approach. 
 
Estimated Ratio of Total Cost to Market Rent 
for Units Leased or Constructed in 1975 
 
Program Pittsburgh  Phoenix 
Public Housing  2.20  1.79 
Section 236  2.01  1.47 
Section 23  1.67  1.11 
Housing Allowances  1.15  1.09 
 
 
Basically, the authors find that the cost of housing allowances exceeds the market rent of 
the units involved by the cost of administering the program.  Subsequent studies (Wallace 
and others, 1981;Weinberg, 1982; Leger and Kennedy, 1990) have confirmed this 
finding.  A plausible explanation for the large difference in the cost-effectiveness of 
Section 23 between the two cities is based on the manner in which the units were 
obtained.  In Pittsburgh, Section 23 units were rented directly by housing authorities that 
assigned tenants to units.  In Phoenix, tenants located a large fraction of units.  The most 
striking findings in the table are the excessive costs of the construction programs.  Their 
costs exceed the market rents of the units by far more than the administrative costs. 
  The study contains a number of other important findings concerning the cost-
effectiveness of variants of the programs considered.  Turnkey public housing was 
developed in 1967 to improve the efficiency of the public housing development process.  
Mayo, Mansfield, Warner, Zwetchkenbaum’s results (p. 134) indicate that turnkey public 
housing is less efficient than conventional public housing.  It is often argued that 
rehabilitation is cheaper than new construction and that nonprofits can produce housing 
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E.  Participation and Benefits in the Urban Section 8 Program (1981) 
 
Wallace, Bloom, Holshouser, Mansfield, and Weinberg, (1981) present highly 
reliable estimates of the cost-effectiveness of Section 8 Existing Certificates and 
estimates that unambiguously understate the cost-ineffectiveness of Section 8 New 
Construction.
9  The costs of Section 8 New Construction are greatly understated by the 
omission of all indirect subsidies, namely GNMA tandem plan interest subsidies, forgone 
tax revenue due to the tax exempt status of interest on bonds used to finance state housing 
agency projects, special accelerated depreciation allowed under the federal income tax, 
FHA insurance losses in excess of premiums, and foregone local property taxes on some 
projects.  Based on previous research on Section 236, authors estimate (p. 226) that the 
program’s cost is understated by between 20 and 30%.  The only cost of the Section 8 
New Construction program included in the analysis is the direct rental payment to the 
owner from the tenant and HUD.  Since these payments are known with great accuracy, 
this provides an unambiguous understatement of the program’s cost in a particular year 
for the units in the sample. 
This study is based on data from 16 metropolitan areas selected at random with 
probability of selection proportional to number of new construction units in the SMSA.  
The random samples of subsidized units used for the cost-effectiveness analysis consist 
of 186 units in 32 Section 8 New Construction projects in 13 SMSAs and 276 units 
occupied by recipients of tenant-based Section 8 Certificates from 83 PHAs in these 
SMSAs.  The Section 8 NC/SR projects were completed and occupied in 1979. 
Two different samples of unsubsidized units with different observed housing and 
neighborhood characteristics were used to estimate relationships explaining market rents.  
One consisted of data on 40, 560 apartments from the American Housing Survey.  The 
other consisted of data on 1365 apartments in the 13 SMSAs collected by Abt Associates.  
The data collected by Abt contained more detailed information about housing and 
neighborhood characteristics. 
The data on the unsubsidized units is used to estimate statistical relationships 
explaining market rent in terms of housing and neighborhood characteristics.  With the 
                                                 
9 Weinberg (1982) provides a condensed version of this study.  25 
smaller sample, separate hedonics were estimated for four regions with dummy variables 
for the SMSAs in those regions.  For the larger sample, separate hedonics were estimated 
for each SMSA.  Characteristics of subsidized units are then substituted into the 
estimated relationships to predict their market rents.  The mean of the predicted market 
rents based on the relevant hedonic based on each sample is compared with mean of the 
rents paid to the owners of the units.  The means of the predicted market rents based on 
the two samples of unsubsidized apartments were similar.  This study contains the best 
estimates of the market rents of subsidized apartments in the literature on the cost-
effectiveness of housing programs. 
The results based on the Abt data on unsubsidized housing are: 
 






over Market Rent 
Section 8 New Construction  $362  $291  24.4% 
Section 8 Existing  $240  $265  -9.4% 
 
Notes:  Total cost of New Construction substantially exceeds rent paid to 
owner due to indirect subsidies.  Cost of each program exceeds rent paid 
to the owner by administrative cost.  To predict correctly differences in the 
overall desirability of housing under the two programs, the predicted 
market rents are for newly occupied units.  Rent paid to owner is less than 
predicted market rent for some occupants of existing units because they 
receive tenure discount. 
 
The results based on the AHS data on subsidized housing are: 
 






over Market Rent 
Section 8 New Construction  $362  $301  20.3% 
Section 8 Existing  $240  $241  0.0% 
 
Notes:  Total cost of New Construction substantially exceeds rent paid to 
owner due to indirect subsidies.  Cost of each program exceeds rent paid 
to the owner by administrative cost.  To predict correctly differences in the 
overall desirability of housing under the two programs, the predicted 
market rents are for newly occupied units.  Rent paid to owner is less than  26 
predicted market rent for some occupants of existing units because they 
receive tenure discount. 
 
These results clearly show that it costs much more to provide identical housing 
via the Section 8 New Construction Program than via the tenant-based Section 8 Existing 
Program. 
 
F.  The Costs of HUD Multifamily Housing Programs (1982) 
 
The bulk of the study by Schnare, Pedone, Moss, and Heintz (1982) deals with the 
extent to which the development cost of projects under variants of Public Housing, 
Section 236, and Section 8 NC/SR exceed the development cost of Section 221(d)(4) 
projects that are the same with respect to some characteristics.  Although Section 
221(d)(4) is usually called an unsubsidized program, it provides a small subsidy in the 
form of a below-market interest rate.  A smaller part of the study (Chapter 7 and its 
appendices) attempt to compare the life-cycle costs of the alternatives. 





!"Section 8 New Construction 
%& 202/8 
%& HUD-FHA Insured 
%& Section 11(b) 
%& SHFA-FHA Insured 
%& SHFA-Not FHA Insured 
!"Section 8 Substantial Rehabilitation  
%& HUD-FHA Insured 
%& SHFA-FHA Insured 
%& SHFA-Not FHA Insured 
!"Section 236 with Rent Supplements 
!"Section 221(d)(4) 
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The two largest variants of Section 8 are New Construction HUD FHA-Insured and 
SHFA Not FHA-Insured.  The other new construction variants and the substantial 
rehabilitation programs are much smaller. 
The authors collected accurate data on the development costs and characteristics 
of a large, stratified random sample of 800 projects built between 1975 and 1979.  After 
expressing all development costs in the prices that prevailed in one time and place, a 
statistical relationship is estimated explaining development cost per unit in terms of the 
characteristics of the project, unit, and neighborhood, characteristics of the sponsor, 
length of the construction period, year that construction began, extent of rehabilitation, 
and the program involved.  The estimated relationship is used to predict the difference in 
mean development cost of units with the same observed characteristics across programs. 
 The  excessive  development costs of projects in the heavily subsidized programs 
compared with projects with the same observed characteristics in the lightly subsidized 
221(d)(4) are: 
 
%& Section 8 New Construction 
o  202/8     16.8% 
o  HUD-FHA        8.7% 
o  11(b)         2.7% 
o  SHFA-FHA    10.5% 
o  SHFA-NonFHA      6.7% 
%& Section 8 Substantial Rehab 
o  HUD-FHA      -5.6% 
o  SHFA-FHA      -3.1% 
o  SHFA-NonFHA       8.7% 
%& Public Housing 
o  Turnkey      35.0% 
o  Conventional      31.0% 
%& Section 236 with rent supplements    -1.0% 
 
These results indicate that the development cost of public housing exceeds that of 
identical projects under the lightly subsidized Section 221(d)(4) program by substantial 
amounts and that the excessive cost is much smaller for the major variants of Section 8 
New Construction and virtually non-existent for Section 236 with rent supplements.  The 
results for the rehab programs should be discounted since these projects are likely to be 
worse with respect to characteristics not included in the regression.  28 
  Although these results are of some interest in understanding the sources of 
inefficiency in construction programs, they do not tell us anything about the overall cost-
effectiveness of alternative housing programs.  For that, we need the entire stream of 
payments to the developers over the time that the projects are used to house low-income 
households.  This matter is addressed in Chapter 7 and its appendices. 
The methods underlying the results reported in the appendices are explained in 
considerable detail.  Unfortunately, they involve assumptions that almost surely bias the 
results towards finding no difference in the cost-effectiveness of subsidized and 
unsubsidized housing.  The methods underlying the results reported in the body of the 
report are hardly explained at all, and the results are quite different from those reported in 
the appendix.  No attempt is made to reconcile the enormously different results. 
  The results in the appendices are based on estimates of the direct payments to 
owners of projects (albeit based indirectly on their expenditures and net income), the 
other direct costs that appear in HUD’s budget (administration cost and interest subsidies 
including GNMA Tandem Plan) and the indirect costs to federal and local governments 
such as local property taxes forgone and excess depreciation allowed on federal income 
tax.  The present value of these costs during the first 20 years for projects in each 
program with the same initial observed housing and neighborhood characteristics is 
calculated and then the constant annual amount with the same present value at a market 
interest rate (11%) is calculated.  Calculations involve assumptions about future trends 
over 20 years that are not based on program experience. 
  The assumptions underlying these calculations almost surely lead to an 
underestimate of the cost of subsidized projects.  Specifically, the study (1) ruled out by 
assumption the possibility that for-profit developers of subsidized projects earn excessive 
profits, (2) assumed that operating expenditures are the same in subsidized and 
unsubsidized projects and that a given operating expenditure will lead to the same 
improvement in housing services in both types of projects, (3) assumed a rate of inflation 
in operating input prices greatly exceeding the actual rate that occurred over the period 
considered, resulting in substantial overstatement of that part of the total cost that was 
assumed to be the same for subsidized and unsubsidized projects, and (4) omitted a few 
major costs of subsidized projects, namely FHA insurance losses in excess of premiums  29 
for all programs providing this insurance and GNMA Tandem Plan interest subsidies for 
Section 221(d)(4) and 236 projects.  Furthermore, ignoring differences in the services 
provided to subsidized households by projects beyond 20 years and the total costs 
incurred to provide these services after 20 years could easily affect the cost-effectiveness 
ranking of the programs. 
  The results in the body are based on the operating costs reported in the appendix 
and a greatly simplified calculation of the costs associated with building the project.  
Specifically, it is assumed that the annual cost associated with building a project is the 
level payment on a 40-year loan at the discount rate used to calculate all present values 
(11%).  Only the annual costs over the first 20 years are involved in the present value 
calculation. 
  For what they are worth, the results are: 
 
Body        Appendix 
%& Section 8 New Construction 
o  202/8         1.2%   -2.0% 
o  HUD-FHA        6.3%   12.1% 
o  11(b)         0.0%   17.5% 
o  SHFA-FHA        7.4%   26.9% 
o  SHFA-NonFHA      3.2%   24.7% 
%& Section 8 Substantial Rehab 
o  HUD-FHA       -5.8%     0.0%-10.3% 
o  SHFA-FHA       -4.2%   12.9%-23.3% 
o  SHFA-NonFHA       2.6%   23.9%-35.1% 
%& Public Housing 
o  Turnkey       21.5%   18.3%-29.6% 
o  Conventional       11.6%     9.5%-24.6% 
%& Section 236 with rent supplements     4.5%    5.8% 
 





Previous research suggests that there are large differences in the cost of providing 
identical housing across different programs that have been used to deliver housing  30 
subsidies.  More specifically, the empirical literature is unanimous in finding that tenant-
based housing certificates and vouchers provide housing of any quality at a much lower 
total cost (that is, cost to all levels of government and tenants) than the types of project-
based assistance studied, namely Public Housing, Section 236, and Section 8 New 
Construction\Substantial Rehab. 
Despite this research, there has been a tremendous resurgence in project-based 
assistance via the tax system, federal block grants to state and local governments, and the 
substantial additional subsidies to public housing and privately owned projects during the 
past 15 years.  Since these new and revised programs have the features that were believed 
to be the source of the substantial cost-ineffectiveness of the programs studied, it appears 
that recent housing policies have been designed by a new generation of housing 
policymakers who are unaware of the previous research. 
This paper discusses the reasons to expect that project-based housing assistance 
will be cost-ineffective compared with tenant-based vouchers, describes the steps in an 
ideal cost-effectiveness analysis, compares the methodology used in previous studies 
with the ideal, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the data and methods used to 
estimate the inputs required to calculate the cost-effectiveness of the program under 
consideration, and presents the results of the previous studies.  Although the weight of the 
evidence is substantial, none of the studies uses a conceptually correct methodology and 
makes highly accurate estimates of all of the magnitudes required to implement this 
methodology. 
When inefficient methods are used to provide housing subsidies to low-income 
households, this is at the expense of some of the millions of poor households who are not 
currently served by these programs.  With the fixed amount of money allocated to them, 
inefficient methods reduce the number of households served.  Based on the existing 
evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that replacing current inefficient methods with the 
most efficient current method would enable us to serve more than a million additional 
low-income households without additional expenditure or harm to current recipients.  In 
light of the results of existing studies and the consequences of using highly inefficient 
programs to deliver housing subsidies, cost-effectiveness studies of all of the major 
discretionary expenditures on project-based housing assistance such as incremental  31 
commitments under the LIHTC and HOPE VI, project-based Section 8 vouchers, and 
public housing operating and modernization subsidies should be HUD’s highest priority 
for housing policy research.  32 
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